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Abstract
In this work we aim to analyze the role of noise in the spatial Public Goods Game, one of the
most famous games in Evolutionary Game Theory. The dynamics of this game is affected by a
number of parameters and processes, namely the topology of interactions among the agents, the
synergy factor, and the strategy revision phase. The latter is a process that allows agents to change
their strategy. Notably, rational agents tend to imitate richer neighbors, in order to increase the
probability to maximize their payoff. By implementing a stochastic revision process, it is possible to
control the level of noise in the system, so that even irrational updates may occur. In particular, in
this work we study the effect of noise on the macroscopic behavior of a finite structured population
playing the Public Goods Game. We consider both the case of a homogeneous population, where
the noise in the system is controlled by tuning a parameter representing the level of stochasticity in
the strategy revision phase, and a heterogeneous population composed of a variable proportion of
rational and irrational agents. In both cases numerical investigations show that the Public Goods
Game has a very rich behavior which strongly depends on the amount of noise in the system and on
the value of the synergy factor. To conclude, our study sheds a new light on the relations between
the microscopic dynamics of the Public Goods Game and its macroscopic behavior, strengthening
the link between the field of Evolutionary Game Theory and statistical physics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, Evolutionary Game Theory (hereinafter EGT) [1–7] represents an emerging
field, whose interdisciplinarity makes it of interest for scientists coming from different com-
munities, from biology to social sciences. The emergence of cooperation [8] in structured
populations [9], in particular in games characterized by a Nash equilibrium of defection, is
one of the main topics studied in this field. For instance, different mechanisms and strategies
have been proposed to foster cooperation [10–12] in paradigmatic games representing pair-
wise interactions, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma [13], and group interactions, namely the
Public Goods Game (hereinafter PGG) [14]. Since these models are mainly studied by means
of numerical simulations, they often lack of an analytical description. However, the latter
can be provided once some specific assumptions are introduced, as for instance considering
memory-aware agents (i.e. able to save their payoff over time) [15]. In the modern area of
complex systems [16, 17], investigations driven by statistical physics [18], trying to relate the
macroscopic emergent behavior to the microscopic dynamics of the agents, are useful to get
insights on a wide range of topics, from socio-economic systems to biological phenomena.
Therefore, in this work we aim to provide a description of the PGG by the lens of statistical
physics, focusing in particular on the impact of noise in the population dynamics. Notably,
the noise is controlled by a parameter adopted in the strategy revision phase (SRP), i.e.,
the process that allows agents to revise their strategy. The SRP can be implemented in
several ways, e.g. considering rational agents that aim to increase their payoff. Usually,
rational agents tend to imitate their richer neighbors, while irrational agents are those that
randomly change their strategy. Remarkably, the level of noise in the system strongly affects
the macroscopic behavior of a population. Although previous works (e.g. [19–22]) focused
on this topic (i.e. the role of noise) in this game, a complete analysis is still missing. In
particular, we study the effect of noise in two different scenarios. We first consider the case
of a homogeneous population, where the intensity of noise in the system is controlled by
tuning the level of stochasticity of all agents during the SRP, by means of a global parame-
ter. The latter is usually indicated by K, and defined as temperature or as an inverse degree
of rationality [14]. Then, we consider a heterogeneous population, characterized by the two
species: rational and irrational agents. While the former take their decision considering the
payoff of their neighbors, the latter take decisions randomly. In both cases, we study the
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macroscopic dynamics of the population and the related equilibria, achieved for different
amount of noise and values of the synergy factor. It is worth to emphasize that the synergy
factor, before mentioned, is a parameter of absolute relevance in the PGG, as it supports
cooperative behaviors by enhancing the value of the total contributions provided by cooper-
ators. Eventually, we recall that the influence of rationality in the PGG has been studied, by
a probabilist approach, in [23] where authors implemented agents able to select (with a given
probability) between a rational and an irrational behavior. The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows: Section II introduces the dynamics of the PGG, and the setup of our
model. Section III shows results of numerical simulations. Eventually, Section IV ends the
paper.
II. THE PUBLIC GOODS GAME
The PGG is a simple game involving N agents that can adopt one of the following
strategies: cooperation and defection. Those playing as cooperators contribute with a coin c
(representing the individual effort in favor of the collectivity) to a common pool, while those
playing as defectors do not contribute. Then, the amount of coins in the pool is enhanced
by a synergy factor r, and eventually equally divided among all agents. The cooperators’
payoff (i.e. pic) and that of defectors (i.e. pid) readpi
c = rN
c
G
− c
pid = rN
c
G
(1)
where N c is the number of cooperators among the G agents involved in the game, r synergy
factor, and c agents’ contribution. Without loss of generality, we set c = 1 for all agents. Let
us proceed focusing the attention on the synergy factor r [14]. In well-mixed populations
of infinite size, where agents play in group of G = 5 players, the two absorbing states
appear separated at a critical point rwm = G = 5. Notably, these populations fall into full
defection for r < rwm and into full cooperation for r > rwm. When agents are placed in the
nodes of a network, surprisingly, some cooperators can survive for values of r lower than
rwm. This effect is known as network reciprocity [9, 22, 24], since a cooperative behavior
emerges as a result of the same mutualistic interactions taking place repeatedly over time.
At the same time, the network structure allows a limited number of defectors to survive
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also beyond r = rwm. We refer to the two critical values of r at which cooperators first
appear, and defectors eventually disappear from the population, respectively as rc1 and rc2.
In a networked population, depending on the values of r and on how agents are allowed
to update their strategy, it is possible to observe different phases: two ordered equilibrium
absorbing phases, where only one strategy survives (either cooperation or defection), and
an active but macroscopically stable disordered phase [15] corresponding to the coexistence
between the two species (i.e. cooperators and defectors). Now, it is worth to introduce the
mechanism that allows the population to evolve, i.e. the process previously mentioned and
defined as strategy revision phase. In principle, the SRP can be implemented in several ways,
as agents may follow different rules or may be provided with particular behaviors. Usually
this process is payoff-driven, i.e. agents tend to imitate richer neighbors [14]. However, as
shown in previous works social behaviors like conformity [25] can have a relevant impact on
the way agents choose their next strategy. In this work we consider a payoff-driven SRP,
computing the probability that one agent imitates a neighbor according to the following
Fermi-like equation
W (sy ← sx) =
(
1 + exp
[
piy − pix
Ky
])−1
(2)
where pix and piy correspond to the payoffs of two linked agents, and sx and sy indicate
their strategy, i.e., that of x and of y, respectively. Notably, equation 2 is related to a
SRP performed by the y-th agent that evaluates whether to imitate the x-th one. A crucial
parameter appearing in equation 2 is Ky, which plays the role of noise and then parametrizes
the uncertainty in adopting a strategy. Notably, a low noise entails agents strongly consider
the difference in payoff ∆p = piy − pix while deciding their next strategy, while increasing
the noise the payoff difference plays a more marginal role. In the case of a homogeneous
population K is equal for all individuals, so by tuning its value we are able to control the
level of noise in the system. In the limit of K = 0, the y-th agent will imitate the strategy
of the x-th agent with probability W = 1 if pix > piy, and W = 0 otherwise. Conversely, in
the limit K → ∞ the SRP becomes a coin flip, and the imitation occurs with probability
W = 1/2 no matter the value of the synergy factor. In the latter case the behavior of
the PGG is analogous to that of a classical voter model [26], where imitation between a
pair of selected agents takes place with probability W = 1/2. Our study aims to confirm
computationally results reported in [20, 22], and to evaluate the relation between r and K,
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in order to provide a complete description of the PGG, from the microscopic dynamics to
the global behavior of the population.
According to previous investigations, setting K = 0.5 is often considered as a good choice
to describe a rational population, where a limited number of irrational updates may still
occur. In the case of bidimensional lattices, it has been shown in [14] that for such K the
values of rc1, at which cooperators emerge, and rc2, where defectors completely disappears
from the population, are respectively equal to 3.75 and 5.5. It is also possible to consider the
case of heterogenous populations where the value of Ky is an agent-dependent parameter.
In such scenario, the simplest way to control the noise is considering two different species of
agents: those with K1 and those with K2. Thus, by varying the density f of one species,
with 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, it is possible to study the outcome of the model in different conditions.
Such second version is useful to analyze the behavior of a population whose agents have
a different sensibility to their payoff and, from a social point of view, it allows to study the
influence of rationality in driving the population towards an equilibrium (or steady state).
For instance, setting K1 = 0.5 and K2 = ∞, it is possible to evaluate the influence of a
density f of rational agents in driving the population towards a particular state. In the
sociophysics literature [27, 28], studying the effects of social behaviors in the dynamics of
a population constitutes one of the major aims. Just to cite few, investigations on noncon-
formity [29], extremisms [30] and stubbornness [31] showed their relevant role in processes
of opinion dynamics [27, 32–35]. Eventually, in a heterogeneous population, it would be
interesting to consider more complicated cases where agents are characterized by a broad
distribution of values of K, and can possibly change their own degree of rationality, for in-
stance by thermalization-like processes (i.e. when two agents play, they modify their degree
of rationality taking the average value of their current K).
Finally, we consider an asynchronous dynamics, where the agents sequentially update
their strategy. In doing so, the population dynamics can be summarized as follows:
1. at t = 0 set a population with the same amount of cooperators and defectors;
2. select randomly two connected agents: x and y;
3. selected agents play the PGG with their communities of belonging (accumulating a
payoff);
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4. y performs the SRP using x as reference (by equation 2);
5. repeat from ii) until the population reaches an ordered phase (or up to a limited
number of time steps elapsed).
We indicate with T the average number of updates per agents at which the dynamics has
been stopped, either because the system reached an absorbing phase or because no significant
macroscopic changes were observed in the system over time. The considered maximum length
of the simulation is 106. Since in the PGG, the strategy of the x-th agent can be described by
a binary variable sx = ±1, with +1 representing cooperation and −1 defection the average
magnetization [36] reads
M =
1
N
N∑
i=1
si, (3)
where M = 1 corresponds to full cooperation, while M = −1 to full defection. Since we
are not interested in the sign of the prevalent strategy, but only to which extent the system
is ordered, we consider the absolute value of the magnetization |M |. From equation 3 it is
straightforward to derive the density ρ of cooperators in the population
ρ =
M + 1
2
(4)
so that we can identify the two (ordered) absorbing states corresponding to ρ = 1 (i.e.
full cooperation) and ρ = 0 (i.e. full defection). In the following section, the system is
analyzed by reporting the average value of ρ, |M | and T over 100 simulations. At last,
another interesting order parameter useful to detect fluctuations in the system’s behavior is
the standard deviation of the fraction of cooperator σ(ρ) obtained over the different runs.
III. RESULTS
We performed several numerical simulations of the PGG, for different values of the synergy
factor r and the noise (measured either in terms of K or density of irrational agents 1−f), in
a population of N = 104 agents distributed on a bidimensional lattice with periodic boundary
conditions.
Homogeneous Populations. Let us here show results for the homogeneous case, where
the level of noise in the system is controlled by the global variable K used in the SRP. We first
analyze the phase diagram of the average density of cooperators 〈ρ〉 as a function of r and K
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FIG. 1. (Color online). Phase diagram of the average density of cooperators 〈ρ〉 at the steady state
(a), time to reach the absorbing state T (b) and standard deviation of the density of cooperators 〈ρ〉
at the steady state (c) as a function of the synergy factor r and the rationality K. Different regions
are highlighted. In region (1) the system is stuck in a metastable active phase, macroscopically
at the equilibrium, with coexistence of cooperators and defectors due to network reciprocity (the
simulations have been stopped after T = 106 updates per agent). In region (2) the system always
reaches the absorbing state predicted by the well-mixed population approximation, i.e. full defection
for r < rwm = 5 and full cooperation for r > rwm. In region (3) both steady states become accessible
with different probability, as in a biased voter model. Results are averaged over 100 simulation
runs.
Figure 1 shows 5 different regions (below described) of interest when studying the density of
cooperators at equilibrium. Notably, low values of K (i.e., K < 10) let emerge three phases
as a function of r in the considered range (i.e., from 3.4 to 6.0): two ordered phases (i.e.,
full defection and full cooperation) for low and high values of r, and a mixed phase (i.e.,
coexistence) for intermediate values of r. Therefore, at a first glance, an order-disorder phase
transition of second kind emerges crossing the region labeled (1) in the first phase diagram
(i.e., a of Figure 1). For higher values of K, next to K = 10, the active phase vanishes and
the population always reaches an ordered phase. A more abrupt phase transition between
the two ordered phases, separating region (2a) (full defection) and (2b) (full cooperation),
appears, resembling analytical results obtained for the well-mixed approximation, even if
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fluctuations are possible near the critical point r = 5. For greater values of K, the region
of r around r = 5 such that both ordered states are attainable increases. In such range of
values the system behaves as a biased voter model, where the absorbing states of cooperation
(defection) is favored for r > 5 (r < 5). In the limit K → ∞, the behavior of the system
approaches that of a classical unbiased voter model, no matter the value of the adopted
synergy factor. Plots b and c of Figure 1 confirm the main differences among the five
regions of plot a. The former shows that the number of time steps reaches the maximum
value of T for intermediate r entered around r = 5 with low K, while T is reduced when the
population reaches an absorbing state (i.e., full defection or cooperation). Instead, plot c
shows that the variance reaches a maximum value (as expected), σ(ρ) = 1/2, when the PGG
behaves like a voter model, while smaller non-null values are also obtained for the active
phase, due to the existence of fluctuations. In order to obtain a deeper characterization
of the phase transitions occurring in the PGG, we study the average absolute value of the
magnetization |M |, as a function of the synergy factor for different K values. As shown in
plot a of Figure 2, only for values of K < 10 there are values of the synergy factors r such
that 〈|M |〉 6= 1, since at K ≈ 10 a more abrupt phase transition between full defection and
full cooperation emerges, resembling the first-order first transition predicted analytically in
the case of well-mixed population of infinite size. Then, we note that for all K values in the
range [0 ≤ K ≤ 10], it is possible to find a synergy factor r such that |M(r)| = 0. Higher
values of K strongly affect the PGG. Notably, the distance between the two thresholds of r
(i.e., rc1 and rc2) reduces by increasing K —see plot b of Figure 2. It is interesting to note
that these two values converge to the same point as r = 5 for K ≥ 10. Furthermore, we also
observe that the value of r0, for which cooperators and defectors coexist in equal number in
the active phase, is always smaller than rwm —see plot b of Figure 2. Eventually, both plots
c and d of Figure 2 clearly confirms the previous investigations. For instance, for K = 10000
the density of cooperators becomes almost flat as in a Voter model (see plot c of Figure 2).
Heterogeneous Populations. We now consider the case of a heterogenous population,
where a density of agents f (0 ≤ f ≤ 1) with K1 = 0.5 is inserted in a population of irrational
individuals, performing coin flip to decide their strategy. In this configuration, the level of
noise is controlled by the variable f , and the lower its value the higher the stochasticity
in the population. As shown in Figure 3, the phase diagram obtained as a function of the
different values of noise is qualitatively comparable to the previously considered case. As
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FIG. 2. (Color online) In the top panels we focus on the transition from the active phase towards
the ordered phase. In (a) we show the average absolute value of the magnetization 〈|M |〉 as a
function of the synergy factor r for different K. As the temperature K increases, the range of r
giving rise to an active phase shrinks around r = rwm = 5 up to a critical value beyond which
network reciprocity disappears. The scaling as a function of K of the two extreme points of the
active range, rc1 and rc2, as well as the value of r0 for which |M | = 0, are shown in (b). In the
bottom panels we show the average density of cooperators 〈ρ〉 (c) and the standard deviation σ(ρ)
for selected values of K. For the three smallest temperatures the system crosses region (1), marked
by a second order transition in 〈ρ〉 and small values of σ. For K = 50, on each single run the
system always reaches one of the two absorbing states. 〈ρ〉 is equal to 0 (1) for low (high) values
of r, but takes intermediate values around r = 5. The transition is quite steep and σ(ρ) = 0 unless
around r = 5. For higher values of K, for even a greater range of values of r around r = 5 both
full defection or cooperation are achievable, 0 < 〈ρ〉 < 1 and σ > 0. In such regime the system
behaves as a biased voter model under the external field r − rwm. As K increases, the behavior of
an unbiased voter model, no matter the value of r, is approached. Results are averaged over 100
simulation runs.
f goes to 1 the PGG turns its behavior to the expected one for a population composed of
only rational individuals (i.e., rc1 = 3.75 and rc2 = 5.5). Remarkably, the outcomes shown
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FIG. 3. (Color online) a) Phase diagram, of the average density of cooperators 〈ρ〉 as a function of
the synergy factor r and the fraction of rational agents in the population f , i.e., those provided with
K1 = 0.5.b Critical thresholds rc1, rc2 of synergy factors, and the value r0 for which cooperators
and defectors coexist in equal number as function of the fraction f of rational agents. Results are
averaged over 100 simulation runs.
in Figure 3 suggest that for values as small as f ∼ 3%, the PGG shows an active phase (i.e.,
the network reciprocity still holds). Thus, very few rational agents are able to provide the
population an overall rational behavior at equilibrium. See plot b of Figure 3 to observe the
scaling for the critical values of the synergy factor: rc1 (at which cooperators first appear),
rc2 (at which defectors disappears), and r0 (where cooperators and defectors coexist in equal
proportion).
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The aim of this work is to provide a detailed study of the role of noise in the PGG by
the lens of statistical physics. Notably, the proposed model allows to define a clear relation
between the noise introduced at the microscopic level in the process named strategy revision
phase, and the macroscopic behavior of a population. To achieve this goal, we start from
the theoretical considerations presented in [19, 20], then considering a richer scenario and
controlling the noise in two different cases: a homogeneous population (i.e. all agents have
the same degree of rationality) and a heterogeneous one (i.e. more degrees of rationality are
considered). The phase diagram resulting from numerical simulations shows the influence
of the synergy factor r and of the noise in the macroscopic behavior of the population. So,
beyond confirming results reported in works as [19, 22], our investigation extends to further
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insights. Notably, the phase diagram (see Figure 1) shows many interesting regions. For
a finite range of values of low noise, there exists a second order phase transition between
two absorbing states as a function of r, with the presence of a metastable regime between
them (region (1) —see plot a of Figure 1). For higher values of noise the active phase
and network reciprocity disappears (regions (2a) and (2b) —see plot a of Figure 1) and the
system always reaches an ordered state. In particular, cooperation (defection) is usually
reached if r is greater (smaller) than the group size G = 5, even if fluctuations are possible
next to the critical point due to the finite size of the system. As the level of noise increases,
the system approaches the behavior of a classical voter model (region (3) —see plot a of
Figure 1), where either one of the two ordered phase is reached no matter the value of the
synergy factor. From the analysis of the heterogenous population case, we note that even
a very small density f of rational agents, f ≈ 3%, allows to observe a network reciprocity
effect. In such sense, beyond the physical interpretation of our results, we deem important
to highlight that, from the perspective of EGT and from that of sociophysics, the PGG is
a system that ’correctly works’ even in the presence of few rational players. Here, saying
that the system ’correctly works’ means that the equilibrium predicted for given a r by the
analysis of the Nash equilibria of the system in the well-mixed approximation is achieved.
Finally, it might be interesting to investigate the behavior of the PGG for populations with
greater heterogeneity in the rationality of the agents, and possibly change it over time. As
a possible interesting case, we suggest that where agents modify their K due to a contact
process, in a thermalization-like process. Even if the average value of K in the population is
constant, we reckon that differences might emerge with regard to the final steady state of the
corresponding homogeneous population, due to the existence of a different initial transient
where the distribution of K is non-trivial. To conclude, our work extends results reported
in previous analyses and, moreover, aims to define a statistical physics interpretation of the
spatial Public Goods Game. In particular as shown in [15] an analytical description, defined
as the population were a classical spin system, may shed new light and even explain the
behavior of those EGT models studied only by a computational approach.
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